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ABSTRACT 
This work seeks to evaluate overnight construction costs 
(OCC) and lead time escalation of nuclear reactors from 
1955 to 2016. To this end, a comprehensive database of 
commercial Light Water Reactors (LWR) was developed 
and a statistical analysis was conducted. Findings reveal 
that there is significant delay in lead time, especially for 
results in the escalation of capital costs rather than a 
decline. Average OCC of newer reactors are 60% higher 
than the ones implemented in the earlier stages of the 
nuclear era. This suggests a negative learning curve 
effect for both OCC and lead time, which threats the 
market and financial sustainability of current and future 
nuclear energy projects. Although this is a general trend, 
this negative effect is country specific and, thus, induced 
by national policies and regulatory frameworks. 
Therefore, the role of nuclear technology to cope with the 
decarbonisation of the power sector must be better 
evaluated, taking into account the real cost impacts of 
nuclear technology implementation.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The glorious times of nuclear power are under pressure.  
1973 oil 
embargo, the nuclear power installed capacity increased 
constructions has stagnated given low oil prices and 
safety concerns after the nuclear accidents in Three Mile 
Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986). In the aftermath of 
the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident (2011), several 
countries have revised their nuclear policies and 
reinforced new regulatory requirements for new 
operating reactors  (Aoki and Rothwell, 2013; Huenteler 
et al., 2012; NRA, 2013; Portugal-Pereira et al., 2014; 
Vivoda, 2012). This results in riskier projects of nuclear 
technology in terms of cost escalation (Sovacool et al., 
2014a). 
The hypothesis underneath this work is that, unlike other 
energy technologies, nuclear energy can actually lead to 
high overnight construction costs (OCC) and long lead 
times given the uncertainty associated with tighten safety 
procedures and increasing complexity of last generation 
reactors. Over time, nuclear technology has become more 
complex, which raised construction and operation and 
maintenance (O&M) costs. Also, environmental licences 
and public acceptance are major reasons for construction 
delays and, consequently, overrun costs. This suggests a 
negative learning curve of nuclear technology, i.e., 
accumulated experience results in a capital cost 
escalation rather than a decline.  
Several studies in the literature looked at learning curves 
for nuclear power and attempted to evaluate the effects 
of main cost drivers (Grubler, 2010; IEA, 2015; Jamasb, 
2007; Kahouli, 2011; Koomey and Hultman, 2007; 
Kouvaritakis et al., 2000). However, learning curves are 
influenced by a vast range of factors and it is difficult to 
isolate specific learning effects (Lovering et al., 2016). 
Berthélemy and Escobar Rangel (2015) provide an 
econometric analysis of nuclear reactor construction 
costs in France and in the United States based on 
overnight cost data. The study concludes that, contrary to 
other energy technologies, innovation leads to increasing 
lead costs. In same line, Sovacool et al. (2014) investigate 
the frequency and magnitude of cost and time overruns 
occurring during the construction of electricity projects 
built over time, and concluded that nuclear reactors are 
the riskiest technology in terms of mean cost escalation 
as a percentage of budget and frequency. Cooper (2014) 
also evaluates nuclear power costs over time and 
concludes that most recent cost projections for new 
nuclear reactors are, on average, over four times as high 
as the initial nuclear reactors.  
Lovering et al. (2016) also assessed the experience curve 
of nuclear reactors, but conclude that there is a positive 
effect learning curve of nuclear technology development. 
Similarly, IEA and NEA reports also show that nuclear 
power costs have dropped over time and will decline or 
remain flat in future (IEA, 2015; Varro and Ha, 2015).  
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While relevant to the field, existing literature of nuclear 
power costs has mainly focused on reactors implemented 
in the USA and France, which account for 1/3 of the 
World operable reactors. Currently major construction of 
nuclear reactors occurs in emerging countries, mainly 
China, South Korea and India. Lovering et al. (2016) 
extended the analysis to these markets, but focus on 
overnight construction costs, which do not reflect 
contingences and escalation of lead time during 
construction.  
The state of the existing literature highlights the need for 
an analysis of the historical experience and trends of 
nuclear costs in order to assess the effect of time 
escalation, increasing safety measures and regulatory 
procedures as main proxies of escalation of costs in the 
nuclear technology.  
In this context, this work seeks to analyse OCC of 
operable light water reactors (LWR) and to assess key 
factors that result in a negative learning curve, including 
increasing complexity of technology, improved passive 
safety measures, tighten sectorial regulatory procedures, 
delay in environmental licences, and public acceptance 
disapproval, especially after the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident.  
Starting from a comprehensive characterisation of 
operable LWR reactors, this study updates and extends 
the OCC of Grubler (2010) and Lovering et al. (2016), 
assessing the learning effect on capital  costs  and lead 
time through statistical analysis of pool data series.    
 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
To assess the OCC and lead time of nuclear reactors, this 
work encompasses two stages, entailing: (i) design of a 
database of World nuclear reactor projects, and (ii) 
statistical analysis of the OCC and lead time of reactors 
over time. 
 
Database of existing nuclear power plants and 
planned future projects 
From the starting point of IAEA power reactor 
information system (PRIS) (IAEA, 2016), a 
comprehensive list of nuclear power reactors has been 
collected. This encompasses over 660 reactors, including 
phased-out, operable, under construction and planned 
nuclear reactor projects from 1955 to 2016. The database 
covers key technological parameters, namely the net 
nominal capacity (GW), the capacity factor (%) and 
reactor technology and model, as well as OCC 
(US$2010/kWh), lead time (years), and operation starting 
year. 
Reactors were than aggregated by technology type, 
model, operational status, country, decade of operation 
starting, and multiple- and single unit plants. This aims 
to assess relevant statistical parameters that dictate the 
trend of OCC and lead time from the early nuclear era 
during the decade 1960 to present days.  
Worldwide several nuclear reactor technologies have 
been developed, namely LWR, pressurised heavy water 
reactors (PHWR), gas-cooled reactors (GCR), and fast-
breeder reactor (FBR). Over time, however, the nuclear 
sector has converged towards the LWR technology, 
which accounts for more than 2/3 of operable reactors 
around the World (IAEA, 2016). For this reason, among 
the overall 661, only LWR, i.e., pressurised water 
reactors (PWR) and boiling water reactors (BWR) units 
have been assessed. Furthermore, the statistical analysis 
excludes pilot and demonstration reactors, 
commercial reactors. Also, only operable reactors were 
assessed due to consistence of available data for OCC. 
This reduces the database to 232 reactors, equivalent to 
35% of total World reactors.    
The geographical scope of the database includes OECD 
countries, former Soviet countries and emerging 
economies. Reactors were classified by technology 
generation according the construction year, including 
Generation I, II, and II+.  
 
Statistical analysis of overnight construction costs 
and lead time 
In project management literature, OCC is defined as the 
construction costs as a project was implemented 
straightaway during day working hours and overnight. 
Therefore, this cost indicator is not sensitive to lead time 
delays and consequently financial costs, financial 
structure of projects, interest rate during construction 
period and public subsidies. Although these parameters 
are tremendously relevant to estimate the total direct 
costs of energy of megaprojects, such as nuclear power 
plants (NPP) (Lovering et al., 2016), the developed 
methodology does not consider financial costs. This is 
however subject of future research work.  
Lead time, on the other hand, refers to time difference 
between the construction start time and the commercial 
operation time, when the reactor is connected to the grid 
after the initial test phase.   
These two indicators (OCC and lead time) have been 
subject of a statistical analysis. For the statistical tests of 
the data series the software package @RISK 7.0 from 
Palisade (2015) has been applied to identify the 
probability distribution function that best fits the data. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate the evolution of OCC 
(US$2010/kW) and the lead time of selected PWR and 
BWR units from the early nuclear era to nowadays. Both 
figures present a trend line for indicative purposes.  
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Figure 1. OCC of PWR and BWR units (US$2010) (all data 
series trend line in blue; minimum values trend line in red). 
 
 
Figure 2. Lead time of PWR and BWR units (years). 
 
Results reveal a general increasing trend of OCC and lead 
time from the the 
very disperse and this trend can be influenced by extreme 
high values, it can be observed that the minimum values 
tend to follow a similar trend, suggesting a negative 
learning curve effect. This negative effect is particularly 
evident for the USA for both OCC and lead time. Data 
for France show also this negative learning curve effect 
for OCC, although much less evident then for the USA, 
but remarkably pronounced for the lead time.  
lead time, nonetheless with evidence of OCC escalation 
among the analysed years. Yet, it is important to 
highlight that the evaluated data series (until 2015) do not 
reflect the on-hold nuclear projects, idle reactors and 
retrofitting costs in the aftermath of the Fukushima Dai-
ichi accident. For instance, the Hamaoka nuclear power 
plant, operated by Chubu Electric Power Co, was 
requested to implement more resistance tsunami 
breakwater walls at a cost of JPY 400 billion (US$ 3.7 
billion) (Esteban and Portugal-Pereira, 2014; NRA, 
2013; World Nuclear Association, n.d.). Furthermore, the 
12 planned new nuclear reactors, totalising 4.1 GW, are 
unlike to be operating in the future, given the sceptical 
public opinion regarding nuclear safety in Japan 
(Portugal-Pereira et al., 2014).  
The only exception of increasing trends goes to Germany 
with positive learning effects for both OCC and 
construction time. Nevertheless, a limited number of 
reactors restricted to the 19
influence in the overall analysis.  
The USA along with Japan and Germany are the 
countries presenting the highest average OCC with the 
USA showing the highest standard deviation and the 
highest lead time. In fact, in the USA there is a large 
dispersion in the standardisation of reactor design. 
 
evident. In the case of Japan, high OCC are related to 
institutional costs and extra safety measures requested in 
a highly seismic country, such as Japan.   
OCC and lead time indicators seem to follow a similar 
distribution, giving rise to the hypothesis that these 
parameters may be related. The correlation coefficient 
between OCC and lead time for data series is 0.48, which 
may be co
 (Suomalainen et al., 2015). It 
can be justified by the increasing complexity of the 
nuclear technology resulting in escalation of lead time, 
higher OCC, possible overruns and additional financing 
costs.  
An interesting outcome is the positive significant 
correlation (0.51) between lead time and the reactor size, 
corroborating Berthélemy and Escobar Rangel (2015) 
results. The average construction time for small reactors 
(<900 MW) is 5.2 years, with a standard deviation of 1.4. 
Large reactors (>900 MW), on the other hand, present a 
lead time of 8.1 years, and a standard deviation of 3.3, 
which translates into higher uncertainty and consequently 
higher OCC. As for OCC, the correlation with reactor 
size is positive but weak (0.22), which shows that relying 
on the OCC for the evaluation of large reactors can be a 
too optimistic approach. The importance of financial 
costs incurred during the construction time is a relevant 
factor not to be neglected on a realistic planning and 
evaluation exercise.    
Figure 3 and Figure 4 corroborate the similar shape of 
probability distribution function (pdf) of OCC and 
construction time series as both of them can be adjusted 
to log-normal function. Although a high concentration of 
values can be found around the average, the positive long 
right tale shows a high dispersion of the database and the 
probability of reaching a construction time or an OCC 
higher than the corresponding average is more than 35%. 
This distribution shape represents energy projects with 
highly risk parameters, such as nuclear reactors.   
 
 
Figure 3. Pdf for OCC of PWR and BWR nuclear reactors 
($USD 2010). 
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Figure 4. Pdf for construction time of PWR and BWR nuclear 
reactors ($USD 2010). 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The accumulated experience of the nuclear reactor 
technology does not translate necessarily a positive 
learning curve. Over time, there is a trend of more 
complex reactors with safer passive systems, tighten 
regulatory procedures, which suggest higher OCC and 
longer lead time. This work sought to evaluate the effects 
of these parameters in the OCC and lead time of nuclear 
reactors from 1955 to 2016. To this end, a comprehensive 
database of commercial LWR reactors was developed 
and a statistical analysis was conducted using the @Risk 
project risk management software.  
Results showed that there are significant delays in lead 
time, which increases over time, especially for the last 
generation reactors constru
to escalation of OCC rather than a decline. Average OCC 
of newer reactors are considerably costlier than the ones 
implemented in the earlier stages of the nuclear era. This 
finding suggests that the nuclear technology is 
significantly costlier than other low-carbon alternatives 
and takes too long to be implemented. This threats the 
market and financial sustainability of future and current 
nuclear energy projects. Therefore, nuclear technology is 
not at the forefront to cope with climate change 
mitigation strategies to contribute to decarbonizing the 
power sector. 
Although the outcomes of this study are intended to bring 
the relevance to policy makers and the nuclear sector in 
the energy debate, this study presents preliminary results 
of ongoing research. Future work intends to expand the 
developed methodology beyond operable reactors in 
order to include phased-out, under construction and 
planned nuclear reactors. Furthermore, future analysis 
will include evaluation of financial costs, as a strategy to 
evaluate meaningful direct construction costs of nuclear 
reactors. 
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